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I. Transnational Climate Law as a Visual Field 
 
Climate change leaves little on this planet untouched. The concept of transnational law is 
no exception.  Transnational law has long functioned as a mechanism for illuminating 
particular legal subjects, processes, and spaces: the empty space left by existing doctrinal 
perspectives,1 the relationships between, around and outside of national laws,2 the 
importance for law of private actors and the power and powerlessness of those actors.3 It 
offers a way of opening our eyes to spheres of normativity other than the nation state and 
distinct ways of conceiving of the nation state itself. But climate change shatters the idea 
that jurisdictional borders and doctrinal debates about the scope of the ‘legal’ are the sole 
tensions with which a concept of transnational law must contend. Climate change exposes 
a further fault line underlying legal thought and practice – the problematic, but deep-rooted 
                                                          
1 Gralf-Peter Calliess and Peer Zumbansen, Rough Consensus and Running Code: A Theory of 
Transnational Private Law (Oxford: Hart, 2010), 11. 
2 Peer Zumbansen, “Defining the Space of Transnational Law: Legal Theory, Global Governance, and 
Legal Pluralism,” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 21, no. 2 (June 2012): 307. 
3 Transnational law scholarship continues to grapple with how to incorporate accounts of diverse actors and 
agents in ways that complement, rather than simply replicate, political science vocabularies. See Natasha 
Affolder, “Transnational Environmental Law’s Missing People,” Transnational Environmental Law 
(2019), DOI: 10.1017/S2047102519000190. 
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practice of separating ‘Human’ from ‘Nature.’ This separation, and its accompanying 
assumption that the natural environment is a limitless resource for human exploitation, is 
powerfully challenged by the reality of a dramatically changing planet, and the rise of 
Anthropocene literatures that bring planetary limits sharply into view. 
 
Transnational law is far from a homogenous field, approach, discourse, theory, or 
methodology for approaching climate law. Nonetheless, core sympathies and 
methodological elements of a transnational approach to climate law do exist alongside 
tensions and disagreements.  In this chapter, I resist cordoning off something called 
‘transnational climate law’ as a distinct field of law.4 Instead, I approach transnational 
climate law as visual field with methodological implications. Transnational law offers an 
approach to understanding the globalization of law with a determined attentiveness to the 
dynamic processes by which law crosses borders and has effects in multiple jurisdictions.5 
The challenges of studying law “after the breakdown of methodological nationalism”6 
create fertile ground for extending the ‘transnational’ from merely a ‘where’ inquiry to a 
visual field capable of illuminating the ‘who’, the ‘how’, the ‘when’ and the ‘why’ of 
transnational lawmaking.  
 
Transnational law is a work-in-progress, valuable even as it operates as a placeholder – a 
signifier that old vocabularies and ways of conceptualising legal actors, norms, and 
relations are inadequate to the task of fully capturing what we are witnessing around us. 
Climate law offers an illuminating point of entry for transnational law to assess misfits 
between theory and practice, between existing legal concepts and vocabularies and 
empirical realities. Words often fail to do justice to the dislocations and disruptions we are 
witnessing.7 Transnational law represents one attempt to find a vocabulary, and a space, 
                                                          
4 This approach resonates with the conclusion that there is not a unified transnational order relating to 
climate change, but rather both disorder and fragmentation. Daniel Bodansky, “Climate Change: 
Transnational Legal Order or Disorder?” in Transnational Legal Orders, ed. Terence C. Halliday and 
Gregory Shaffer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2015), 287–308. 
5 Shaffer and Bodansky capture this well in their definition of transnational environmental law, which 
“includes national environmental regulation that has horizontal effects across jurisdictions – for example, 
by providing regulatory models to other countries or by applying to or affecting the behavior of producers 
and consumers within them. It also includes the development of standards by private actors that have 
effects across borders, such as through product certification and labeling regimes.” Gregory Shaffer and 
Daniel Bodansky, “Transnationalism, Unilateralism and International Law,” Transnational Environmental 
Law 1, no. 1 (2012): 32. 
6 Ralf Michaels, “Globalization and Law: Law Beyond the State,” in Law and Social Theory, ed. Reza 
Banakar and Mark Travers (Oxford: Hart, 2013), 287. 
7 A point illustrated by the search for language to responsibly report on the climate crisis. See Damian 
Carrington, ‘Why the Guardian is Changing the Language it Uses About the Environment’ The Guardian 
(London, 17 May 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/may/17/why-the-guardian-is-
changing-the-language-it-uses-about-the-environment>. 
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for acknowledging the misalignment between the singularity of the nation state/interstate 
framework that underlies much legal theory and the messy reality of the people, places and 
forms of law that climate law-making brings into view. Moreover, climate law sharply 
challenges the view that the only non-state actors of interest to transnational law are 
globalized business interests.8 
 
Even as climate law scholarship seems ever more unavoidably transnational,9 there is a 
tendency to reserve the transnational law label for only those legal developments 
happening outside the main tent of state and inter-state activity. This leads to a problematic 
relegation of the transnational to an alternative universe or separate script (Section II). It 
results in a superficial appreciation of transnational law, where what is noticed are the new 
actors, assemblages and arrangements of climate governance. What risks getting missed 
are the seismic legal transformations implicated by these new climate governance 
arrangements. Approaching transnational climate law as a visual field offers a way of 
challenging the separation of a transnational sphere from ‘the rest.’ Transnational climate 
law thus offers a way of bringing into view an integrated picture of climate law’s 
migrations (II.1), interactions (II.2) and revelations (II.3).   
This chapter is not a marketing brochure for transnational law. As well as celebrating 
transnational law’s capacity to bring neglected visions of law’s actors and law-making 
processes into view, it is alert to what a transnational law lens might miss or obscure. The 
spaces and rhythms of transnationalism favour a visual fix on processes, flows, networks, 
and governance arrangements that may be only partially tethered to people.10 This leads to 
several tensions. Climate law scholarship already tends to privilege accounts of a handful 
of ‘innovative’ examples of legislation and lawsuits that bear the climate law label, leaving 
untouched vast areas of law that facilitate or advance climate change.  Environmental law 
and clean energy law are the points of interest rather than the much larger subject areas of 
unenvironmental law and unclean energy law (III.1). Transnational law has a still uncertain 
relationship with legal ‘practice’ (III.2), and a tendency to work in terms of abstract 
                                                          
8 Acknowledging that transnational law is “most commonly seen in close relation to the demographics and 
institutional formations of globalized business interests” and thus, that the reimagining of transnational law 
as a ‘critlaw’ project is “anything but intuitive”, see Peer Zumbansen, “Can Transnational Law be Critical? 
Reflections on a Contested Idea, Field and Methods” in Research Handbook on Critical International 
Theory (2019, forthcoming), ed. Emilios Christodoulidis. 
9 Much of the climate law literature referenced in Ronald Mitchell’s analysis of climate law’s 
accomplishments speaks to transnational developments in the field even though transnational law is not an 
explicit focus of that analysis. Ronald B. Mitchell, “Climate Law: Accomplishments and Areas for 
Growth,” Climate Law 8, nos. 3–4 (2018): 135–50. 
10 On some little-explored costs associated with the shift to the transnational in feminist legal theory, see 
Mariana Valverde, Chronotopes of Law: Jurisdiction, Scale and Governance (London: Routledge, 2015), 
106. 
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processes rather than real ones populated by diverse actors (III.3). A transnational lens, 
applied to climate change law, may thus risk writing out particular people and 
understandings of nature from law’s past, present and future. 
The concept of the Anthropocene has effectively ripped to shreds many of the analytical 
categories that have served as frames for thinking about both the environment and law 
since the Enlightenment. While social theorists are dismantling the intellectual walls that 
separate human society from nonhuman nature, the geological from the generational, the 
local from the global, and the scientific from the political, an appreciation of these same 
cleavages is critical to understanding transnational law’s history and epistemology.11 
Climate change is “legally disruptive”12 in ways that are only beginning to be understood. 
Transnational climate law brings new boundaries into transnational law’s visual field – 
planetary boundaries. 
II. Transnational Climate Law: Out of the Margins 
The term ‘transnational climate law’ is not widely used to denote a recognized ‘field’ of 
law.13 There may be good reasons for this. By framing transnational climate law as a field, 
it becomes simply a new box, a box for misfits – things that fall outside the well-established 
categories of international, national, regional and local climate change law. 
Conceptualising transnational climate law as a field risks merely setting up a new box and 
putting a new set of things within it, in the process obscuring the impact of the box’s 
contents on everything left outside. The vital interactions between what is conceptualised 
as the transnational and what is more comfortably seen as recognizable law gets missed.14  
 
Transnational climate law has many sources upon which to draw, including pioneering 
work from transnational environmental law and the ever-growing body of theoretical and 
conceptual work on transnational law that has developed since Philip Jessup’s 
Transnational Law (1956).15 That volume, written more than sixty years ago, identifies 
some of the tensions and pressure points that are today manifest in approaching climate 
change as a transnational legal problem. Jessup conceived of the transnational not as a 
                                                          
11 Perrin Selcer expresses this as the need to acknowledge “antiecological environmental history.” Perrin 
Selcer, The Postwar Origins of the Global Environment: How the United Nations Built Spaceship Earth 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 11. 
12 Elizabeth Fisher, Eloise Scotford, and Emily Barritt, “The Legally Disruptive Nature of Climate 
Change,” Modern Law Review 80, no. 2 (March 2017): 173–201. 
13 For an uncommon example of the term’s use, see Thijs Etty et al., “Editorial: Transnational Climate 
Law,” Transnational Environmental Law 7, no. 2 (2018): 191–200. 
14 Charles Roger, Thomas Hale, and Liliana Andonova, “The Comparative Politics of Transnational 
Climate Governance,” International Interactions 43, no. 1 (2017): 2. 
15 Philip C. Jessup, Transnational Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956).  
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distinct realm from either the domestic or the international, but rather as an array of tools 
and approaches to legal problems.  Relevant sources of law extended far beyond public and 
private international law to encompass a holding pen of possible, but not defined, “other 
rules which do not wholly fit into such standard categories.”16  
Jessup’s articulation of Transnational Law acknowledged the context of law-making in a 
“complex interrelated world community,”17 clarifying both that law’s problems transcend 
legal sub-disciplines and that they extend to the extra-legal or metajuridical.18 Jessup was 
thus attentive to the ways that rules emerge from sources distinct from positivist-inspired 
conceptions of state law, referencing “practices” as diverse as those of General Motors, 
secret societies, towns, cities, or states.19 From the vantage point of Jessup’s writing, 
climate law scholarship seems remarkably siloed. Invisible barriers separate studies of the 
legal (climate law) and the interstate (the international climate governance architecture) 
from the reality of a sub-state/supra-state/non-state (often described as transnational 
climate governance). These are barriers that a transnational law approach both brings into 
view and helps break down.  
A formidable challenge in writing about climate law at any level is the sheer enormity of 
the subject. When the relevant literatures are this vast and the legal developments so fast-
moving, any commentary is partial, possibly outdated, and ignorant of important new 
developments and literatures. As scholars devote much time and intellectual resources to 
understanding and explaining new developments in context, it is easy to bemoan the 
absence of a more critically-inspired scholarship.20 In many ways, attempting the sort of 
border-crossing, practice-embracing, interdisciplinary-leaning transnational law approach 
inspired by Philip Jessup seems either futile or fool-hardy in the context of climate law. 
International relations scholars and political scientists are responsible for much of the 
voluminous literature on transnational climate governance.21 This transnational work now 
includes both climate mitigation and climate adaptation, resisting an earlier tendency to 
focus on global efforts of climate mitigation and local examples of climate adaptation.22 
                                                          
16 Ibid, 2. 
17 Ibid, 1. 
18 “One notes that the problem of extracting and refining oil in Iran may involve - as it has - Iranian law, 
English law, and public international law. Procedurally it may involve - as it has - diplomatic negotiations, 
proceedings in the International Court of Justice and in the Security Council, business negotiations with 
and among oil companies, and action in the Iranian Majlis.” Ibid, 6. 
19 Ibid, 9. 
20 Benoit Mayer, “The Critical Functions of Scholarship in Climate Law,” Climate Law 8, nos. 3–4 (2018): 
151–60. 
21 See Roger, Hale, and Andonova, “The Comparative Politics of Transnational Climate Governance,” 2. 
22 Åsa Persson and Adis Dzebo, “Special Issue: Exploring Global and Transnational Governance of 
Climate Change Adaptation,” International Environmental Agreements 19, no. 4 (2019): 357–58. 
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This work frequently locates transnational developments in a separate sphere from state 
law-making, analyzing it through questions of orchestration and effectiveness without fully 
integrating it into the reality of plural sources and venues of law-making. The result is the 
transnational realm tending to be seen as an add-on, and transnational governance as a 
“complement” to the UN Climate Regime and the Paris Agreement architecture.23 Such a 
view endorses the message that interstate processes are the core of international climate 
change law. The transnational only exists as a sideshow, a realm that the core may choose 
to engage with as the Paris Agreement has done.24  
The Paris Agreement itself suggests, perhaps, another reality: an intense intermingling of 
the public/private, state/non-state, hard law/soft law developments that currently dominate 
climate regulation. The treaty replaces state ‘commitments’ with ‘contributions,’ and 
introduces a compliance mechanism aimed at ‘facilitating’ rather than ‘enforcing’ 
compliance. The ‘ratcheting mechanism’ at the heart of the treaty has been described as 
requiring support from cities, companies and other non-state actors to be effective. Indeed, 
the treaty has been praised for strengthening the role of networks of state and non-state 
actors in climate policy and technology.25 It has given unprecedented visibility to the 
actions of non-state and sub-state actors. Indeed, the architecture put in place by the Paris 
Agreement might only be functional in the context of massive infusions of funding from 
private sources.26 The Paris Agreement itself might suggest that the types of initiatives that 
a transnational law approach brings into view have already altered understandings of core 
versus peripheral actors in lawmaking, challenging fundamental expectations of what 
treaties can do, and of who is required for effective ‘implementation’. The form, nature, 
and function of law-making under the Paris Agreement all seem to push back against a 
view where the ‘transnational’ elements can be viewed separately from the ‘interstate,’ the 
stuff of real public international law. 
And yet, the Paris Agreement is far from an anomaly in its integration of public, private 
and transnational lawmaking. Rather, it is representative in many ways of the structure of 
international lawmaking on climate change, where treaties have reached deeply into 
                                                          
23 For a perspective that this transnational sphere of governance has “complemented” the interstate regime, 
see Laura Mai, “The Growing Recognition of Transnational Climate Governance Initiatives in the UN 
Climate Regime: Implications for Legal Scholarship,” Climate Law 8, nos. 3–4 (2018): 183. 
24 Ibid, 184, 193. 
25 Stephen Minas, “The Paris Agreement to Strengthen Role of Networks in Climate Policy and 
Technology,” Global Policy, 23 December 2015, 
http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/23/12/2015/paris-agreement-strengthen-role-networks-climate-
policy-technology. 
26 Cinnamon Carlarne, Kevin R. Gray, and Richard Tarasofsky, “International Climate Change Law: 
Mapping the Field,” in The Oxford Handbook of International Climate Change Law, ed. Kevin R. Gray, 
Richard Tarasofsky, and Cinnamon Carlarne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 22. 
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nations and regions without limitation from traditional conceptions of treaty 
implementation and compliance. The emissions trading system and Clean Development 
Mechanism emerging from the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change and the 
1997 Kyoto Protocol have engaged actors other than State Parties and influenced private 
actor conduct in both signatory and non-signatory states. In so doing, they have promoted 
regulatory convergence and conformity to the Kyoto Protocol requirements by non-
signatories and non-state actors with regards to business and regulatory conduct.27 
A transnational law lens is valuable in revealing the inequalities and asymmetries that mark 
global or international approaches to climate change, in contemplating transnational legal 
spaces not simply as add-ons, but instead as counterpoints to interstate and national 
approaches. The “deep moral disagreements” and “deep divides” between climate justice 
and neoliberalism have created competing visions for climate law’s objectives.28 Critiques 
of the Paris Agreement reveal this intellectual battleground, describing it as a largely neo-
liberal document29 that allows individual liberties to “trump all other social and political 
ideals.”30 The battleground emerges in the detailed studies of how legal responses to 
climate change deepen existing social inequalities.31 And in scholarship revealing the 
limitations of governance ‘by disclosure.’32 
The point of conceiving of transnational climate law in terms of its visual field is not about 
simply seeing and marveling at the infinite variety of forms and norms emerging in the 
technical regimes of climate governance. Transnational law produces ways of knowing, 
“particular understandings of the world and how it works.”33 Below, I identify three 
particular dimensions of law-making that transnational climate law brings into closer view: 
migrations, interactions, and revelations. 
                                                          
27 ‘Kyoto compliance’ was a claim frequently made by companies, even though these private businesses 
had no obligations under the treaty, and even when they were resident in non-signatory countries. 
28 Rosemary Lyster, “The Idea of (Climate) Justice, neoliberalism, and the Talanoa Dialogue,” Journal of 
Human Rights and the Environment 10, no. 1 (2019): 36. In these characterizations, she draws upon John S. 
Dryzek, “The Deliberative Democrat’s Idea of Justice,” European Journal of Political Theory 12, no. 4 
(2013): 329–46. 
29 David Ciplet and J. Timmons Roberts, “Climate Change and the Transition to Neoliberal Environmental 
Governance,” Global Environmental Change 46 (2017): 148–56. 
30 Ibid, 149. 
31 See e.g. Julia Dehm, “Authorizing Appropriations: Law in Contested Forest Spaces,” European Journal 
of International Law 28, no. 4 (2017):1379–96. 
32 See e.g. Brett Christophers, “Climate Change and Financial Instability: Risk Disclosure and the 
Problematics of Neo-liberal Governance,” Annals of the American Association of Geographers 107, no. 5 
(2017): 1109. 
33 Duncan Kennedy, “The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault,” Legal Studies Forum 15, no. 4 (1991): 
361. 
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1. Migrations 
The concept of the transnational adopted in the early writings of international relations 
scholars was attentive to both the idea of movement and to the interaction of actors and 
norms. Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane defined transnational interactions as “the 
movement of tangible or intangible items across state boundaries when at least one actor is 
not an agent of a government or an intergovernmental organization.”34 Today, when 
practices of transferring legal norms, models, arguments, and judicial reasoning across 
borders are a central feature of climate law, understanding how and why legal ideas move 
becomes more urgent. This is particularly the case when environmental principles provide 
a vital legal pivot point for illuminating rights and obligations in both legislation and 
litigation.35 Accounts of the dynamics of climate law’s movements are needed to 
complement the valuable micro-studies and maps that have already produced rich and 
diverse understandings of the significance of networks of unconventional state and non-
state actors such as cities,36 government Ministers,37 investor-driven governance 
networks,38 and judges.39 The movements in question extend beyond national borders and 
permeate supra-national and sub-national lawmaking processes, private environmental 
governance, sites of Indigenous lawmaking, legal cultures and traditions, judicial discourse 
and international organisational practice.  
The most visible faces of climate law emerge through databases collecting examples of 
‘global’ climate legislation40 and climate litigation.41 For example, a 2018 Climate 
Legislation Study calculated that more than 1,500 laws to curb climate change have now 
                                                          
34 Joseph S. Nye and Robert O. Keohane, “Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction,” 
International Organizations 25, no. 3 (1971): 332 (emphasis mine). 
35 See Eloise Scotford, Environmental Principles and the Evolution of Environmental Law (Oxford: Hart, 
2017). 
36 Jolene Lin, Governing Climate Change: Global Cities and Transnational Lawmaking (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2018); Taedong Lee, “Global Cities and Transnational Climate Change 
Networks,” Global Environmental Politics 13, no. 1 (2013): 108–28. 
37 See e.g. Karin Bäckstrand’s discussion of the Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum. Karin 
Bäckstrand, “Accountability of Networked Climate Governance: The Rise of Transnational Climate 
Partnerships,” Global Environmental Politics 8, no. 3 (2008): 74–102. 
38 Michael MacLeod and Jacob Park, “Financial Activism and Global Climate Change: The Rise of 
Investor-Driven Governance Networks,” Global Environmental Politics 11, no. 2 (2011): 54–74. 
39 Examples include the United Nations Environment Programme’s (“UNEP”) Environmental Rule of Law 
Programme and the Asian Judges Network on Environment. Stephen Minas, “The Rise of Transnational 
Networks in Climate Change Governance: A Study in Hybridity,” TLI Think! 5 (2015): 7–8. 
40 For example, since 2010 the Grantham Research Institute (“GRI”) and Global Legislators Organisation 
for a Balanced Environment (“GLOBE International”) have prepared studies of national law and policies 
directly related to climate change mitigation and adaptation.  
41 The Sabin Center for Climate Change Law at NYU Law School maintains databases of both US and non-
US litigation. Sabin Center for Climate Change, http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/resources/. 
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been passed, an increase from around 70 laws in place two decades ago.42 Econometric 
research drawing on earlier versions of this dataset of legislation indicates instances of 
international policy diffusion from this data, asserting that the climate action one country 
undertakes is likely to depend on prior climate legislation by other countries.43 
These datasets, and the studies that draw on them, reveal several of the methodological 
challenges plaguing climate law’s intellectual development. These challenges include the 
problem of how to define climate legislation or litigation. Even more poignantly, they 
reveal the complexity and unevenness that results from any attempt to provide a 
comprehensive ‘global’ image of legislative activity or litigation, challenges that manifest 
through the English-language bias of much published work, the tendency to only count and 
compare federal legislation,44 and a common instinct to see directionality rather than 
variation in how law moves from place to place.45  
The message of ‘progress’ emerging from the growth in numbers of so-called climate laws 
can be misleading. Given the significant pressure on states to be seen to be responding to 
climate change, the concern develops that even while the number of ‘climate laws’ is 
growing, actual reform is shallow and minimalist, focused on disclosing carbon emissions 
rather than profoundly reducing them.46 The vast subject matter of what might be targeted 
by climate legislation indeed makes comparison complex and threatens the rigour of 
studies by comparing metaphorical “apples and oranges.”47 Climate laws target things as 
diverse as introducing systems of tax credits48 and carbon pricing,49 promoting renewable 
energy,50 disaster response,51 the preservation of glaciers,52 or strengthening resilience to 
                                                          
42 Michal Nachmany and Joana Setzer, Global Trends in Climate Change Legislation and Litigation: 2018 
Snapshot (London: Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, 2018), 2. 
43 Samuel Fankhauser, Caterina Gennaioli, and Murray Collins, “Do International Factors Influence the 
Passage of Climate Change Legislation?” Climate Policy 16, no. 3 (2016): 318–31. 
44 Terry Townshend et al., “Legislating Climate Change on a National Level,” Environment: Science and 
Policy for Sustainable Development 53, no. 5 (2011): 7–9. 
45 Lawrence Rosen, “Beyond Compare,” in Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions, ed. 
Pierre Legrand and Roderick Munday (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 502–3. 
46 See Ciplet and Roberts, “Climate Change and the Transition to Neoliberal Environmental Governance.” 
47 Johann Dupuis & Robbert Biesbroek, “Comparing Apples and Oranges: The Dependent Variable 
Problem in Comparing and Evaluating Climate Change Adaptation Policies,” Global Environmental 
Change 23, no. 6 (2013): 1476–87. 
48 Ley del Impuesto Especial Sobre Producción y Servicios, Diario Oficial de la Federación [“DOF”] 30-12-
1980, última reforma DOF 15-11-2016 (Mexico). 
49 Australian National Registry of Emissions Units Act 2011 (Cth.) (Australia). 
50 Ley de Transición Energética, DOF 24-12-2015 (Mexico); The Energy Conservation Act, 2001, No. 52 
of 2001, India Code. 
51 Wet van 1 december 2011, Stb. 2011, 604 (The Netherlands). 
52 Law No. 26639, 28 October 2010 (Argentina). 
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food insecurity.53 And yet, the cross-sectoral orientation of climate change threats means 
that legislation labelled ‘climate legislation’ may not even be where the action is or needs 
to be.54  
The wildfire-like spread of climate strikes in 2019, ignited by the actions of Swedish 
teenage climate activist Greta Thunberg, has legal parallels in the explosive growth of 
climate change lawsuits. These lawsuits have attracted ‘uptake’ and led to widespread 
emulation even where the specific facts and relevant law makes replication unlikely,55 and 
even when the cases have yet to successfully reach a trial court.56 Analysis of the forms of 
climate litigation emerging in the Global South valuably extends an understanding of the 
diverse forms and manifestations of climate litigation, as well as “stealthy” forms of 
response in the face of judicial reluctance to engage directly with politically charged issues 
of climate law and policy.57 
This movement of legal forms, ideas, and models extends to financial and market 
instruments. The EU has sought a position of climate leadership, in part by deliberately 
developing models capable of transplantation elsewhere.58 The EU’s Emission Trading 
Scheme has thus served as a model for many countries looking to introduce the legal 
infrastructure necessary for domestic carbon markets. But it is proving challenging to 
export.59 Voluntary markets for trading in forest carbon have also given rise to models for 
the regulatory markets that have followed in their wake.60 For example, the carbon 
                                                          
53 Décret No. 2016-0102/P-RM, 26 February 2016, [2016] Journal Officiel de la République du Mali, 488. 
54 See Jaclyn Rolfe, “Combating Climate Change with Words: The Effect of Incorporating ‘Climate 
Change’ into Development-Regulating Laws,” Queensland Environmental Practice Reporter 15, no. 70 
(2010): 164–79. 
55 The well-known Dutch Urgenda decision, for example, has inspired copycat litigation in Belgium, 
Switzerland and Ireland and also had a tangible influence on the environmental advocacy community in 
Australia, despite significant differences between Australian common law and Dutch civil law. Urgenda 
Foundation v. The State of the Netherlands, HA ZA 13-1396, C/09/456689 (The Hague Dist. Ct., 2015). 
See Jacqueline Peel, Hari Osofsky, and Anita Foerster, “Shaping the Next Generation of Climate Change 
Litigation in Australia,” Melbourne University Law Review 41, no. 2 (2017): 805.  
56 While the Juliana lawsuit initiated in the United States in 2015 by twenty-one youth plaintiffs against 
the United States and several of its officers has yet to advance to trial, it is widely cited as an inspiration 
and model for other climate change litigation. Juliana v United States, No. 6:15-CV-01517-TC, 2016 WL 
6661146 (D. Or. 10 November 2016). 
57 See Jacqueline Peel and Jolene Lin, “Transnational Climate Litigation: The Contribution of the Global 
South,” American Journal of International Law (2019): 55, DOI: 10.1017/ajil.2019.48. 
58 Kati Kulovesi, “Climate Change in the EU External Relations: Please Follow my Example (or I Might 
Force You to),” in The External Environmental Policy of the European Union: EU and International Law 
Perspectives, ed. Elisa Morgera (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 115–48. 
59 Anatole Boute, “The Impossible Transplant of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme: The Challenge of 
Energy Market Regulation,” Transnational Environmental Law 6, no. 1 (2017): 59–85. 
60 Natasha Affolder, “Transnational Carbon Contracting: Why Law’s Invisibility Matters,” in The Politics 
of Private Transnational Governance by Contract, ed. A. Claire Cutler and Thomas Dietz (London: 
Routledge, 2017), 225. 
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disclosure movement informed regulatory developments of institutions such as the 
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Environmental Protection Agency in the 
United States as they formalized carbon accounting standards.61  
Yet despite all of this activity, the challenge remains of developing the terminology and 
frameworks capable of describing law’s migrations so that they reflect the novel 
polycentric forms of normativity visible in climate law practice. The model of the ‘legal 
transplant’ continues to exert a powerful influence on both the vocabularies and the 
methods of tracing the movement of legal norms even though it fails to capture the forms 
of “‘borrowing,’ ‘mimicking,’ ‘impregnation’ and other forms of ‘travelling’” that shape 
climate law developments.62 A singular language of diffusion or transfer risks obscuring 
the fact that the movements of legal ideas in question are diverse and multi-directional – 
ranging from the Kyoto Protocol’s borrowing of legal concepts from national pollution 
control law63 to the circulation of legal norms through value chain contracting.64 Post-
colonial scholarship can make significant contributions here by turning the lens towards 
the particularity and historicity of human experience and challenging universal histories of 
law’s movements across time and space.65 
Climate law moves in diverse and unexpected ways, but that does not mean that practices 
of dissemination and circulation of legal models are random or surprising. Legal reformers 
and entrepreneurs (both public and private) have for decades pioneered and funded legal 
readiness projects to provide templates for regulatory and legislative schemes that are 
‘shovel ready’ for wider use in climate governance. These work to both advance, and 
retard, progressive climate legislation. For example, the American Legislative Exchange 
Council (ALEC)’s practice of supplying templates of ready-made model legislation such 
as “Environmental Literacy Improvement Acts” for state implementation has been a key 
strategy for institutionalizing climate denialism and doubt in US schools. Climate law 
advocates have themselves sought to harness ALEC’s strategy by producing their own 
                                                          
61 David L. Levy, “Private Actors and Strategies in Global Environmental Governance: The Role of 
Information Disclosure,” in Handbook of Global Politics, 2nd ed., ed. Peter Dauvergne (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2012), 315. 
62 Peer Zumbansen, “Law & Society and the Politics of Relevance: Facts and Field Boundaries in 
‘Transnational Legal Theory in Context,’” No Foundations 11 (2014): 3. 
63 Jonathan B. Wiener, “Something Borrowed for Something Blue: Legal Transplants and the Evolution of 
Global Environmental Law,” Ecology Law Quarterly 27, no. 4 (2001): 1297, 1308. 
64 For a rare attempt to place law at the centre of the analysis of what have historically been addressed as 
“economic structures,” see The IGLP Law and Global Production Working Group, “The Role of Law in 
Global Value Chains: A Research Manifesto,” London Review of International Law 4, no. 1 (2016): 58. 
65 For an example of the contributions of such work to literatures of the environment, see Elizabeth M. 
DeLoughrey and George B. Handley, eds., Postcolonial Ecologies: Literatures of the Environment 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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versions of a “playbook” for progressive climate policies “ready to be distributed, ALEC 
style, to local state and federal lawmakers.”66 The movement of these models and 
prototypes extends far beyond state and national borders. Indeed, the production and 
transnational dissemination of policies for climate adaptation are climate governance 
strategies of many intergovernmental organizations.67 Given the significant role of 
experimentation in climate governance68 and the diversity of institutions with climate 
mandates, the production and circulation of models and prototypes of carbon regulation for 
‘scaling up’ is a critical, but easily obscured, site of transnational legal activity. 
2. Interactions  
The task of tracing migrations of legal norms might mistakenly suggest that such 
migrations are unilateral and unidirectional and only manifest through legislation and 
judicial decisions. The practices of climate lawmaking speak to another reality, one of the 
complex interaction of legal processes, actors and norms. Transnational legal theory 
provides many entry points for exploring the significance of both the scale of interaction 
and the interacting entities involved.69 Climate law scholarship illuminates in particular the 
multiple and sometimes hidden layers of regulation, as well as the deformalisation of 
climate law processes.70 A challenge for lawyers is that there are often no obvious answers 
or solutions to be found by simply applying legal doctrine when discussing questions of 
hierarchy and the conflict or simple co-existence of norms in the legal landscapes 
governing climate issues today.71  
Project-level studies of climate law transactions illustrate this reality up close. Tracing the 
relevant legal frameworks applicable to a Clean Development Mechanism project leads to 
a lengthy list of ‘relevant law’ ranging from international law sources, to the domestic law 
of the host country and possibly the purchasing country, to the key contract itself (the 
                                                          
66 Jeremy Deaton “These Lawyers are Creating an ALEC for Climate Change” (Nexus Media, 1 April 
2019), https://nexusmedianews.com/these-lawyers-are-creating-an-alec-for-climate-change-67cbd081e828. 
67 United Nations Development Programme, Adaptation Policy Frameworks for Climate Change: 
Developing Strategies, Policies, and Measures, ed. Bo Lim and Erika Spanger-Siegfried (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005); UN Habitat, Planning for Climate Change: A Strategic, Values-Based 
Approach for Urban Planners (Nairobi: UN Habitat, 2014). 
68 See Paula Kivimaa et al., “Experiments in Climate Governance – A Systematic Review of Research on 
Energy and Built Environment Transitions,” Journal of Cleaner Production 169 (2017): 17–29. 
69 For an analysis of transnational legal theory’s incomplete attempts to account for transnational business 
interactions, see Stepan Wood et al., “The Interactive Dynamics of Transnational Business Governance: A 
Challenge for Transnational Legal Theory,” Transnational Legal Theory 6, no. 2 (2015): 333–69. 
70 Kati Kulovesi, “Exploring the Landscape of Climate Law and Scholarship: Two Emerging Trends,” in 
Climate Change and the Law, ed. Erkki J. Hollo, Kati Kulovesi, and Michael Mehling (Dordrecht: Springer 
2013), 31–62. 
71 Veerle Heyvaert, Transnational Environmental Regulation and Governance: Purpose, Strategies and 
Principles (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 41.  
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Emissions Reduction Purchase Agreement) invoking both contract law and private 
international law rules, and specifically referencing formal or informal best practice 
standards, all the while subject to tax and accounting rules.72  
There are stark implications for teaching climate law that emerge from the reality that 
carbon contracting work demands diverse competencies across public international law, 
private international law, and business, tax and contract law, as well as up-to-date 
knowledge of the best practices and standards.73 The legal backdrop to these transactions 
is complicated by the fact that the architecture for climate finance has evolved in a 
fragmented manner with overlapping treaties, organisations, and mechanisms providing 
rules and practices at global, regional, and national levels.74 The need for lawyers who are 
able to appreciate the legal and financial complexities of carbon contract transactions while 
knowledgeably navigating the human rights obligations and implications of those 
transactions comes to light in particular through the study of REDD+ transactions.75 
Scholarship continues to illuminate the fact that climate change solutions, and not just 
climate change, can be disastrous for human rights.76   
Furthermore, the oft-contested terrain of climate finance and clean energy projects reveals 
that interactions between legal regimes are not always positive or synergistic. Mark Pollack 
and Gregory Shaffer’s study of the interaction of transnational legal orders speaks to both 
processes of “antagonistic interaction” and the result of those processes – “increasing 
confusion rather than progressive development of law.”77 These interactions tend to elicit 
commentary attentive to the surface-level tensions that plague climate law’s smooth and 
effective development and spread. Simmering not far below the surface of climate law are 
far deeper ideological conflicts. 
  
                                                          
72 Kati Kulovesi, “Exploring the Landscape of Climate Law and Scholarship,” 36. 
73 For examples of the breadth of the legal terrain invoked by carbon contracting, see Affolder, 
“Transnational Carbon Contracting”; Katerina Peterkova Mitkidis, “Using Private Contracts for Climate 
Change Mitigation,” Groningen Journal of International Law 2, no. 1 (2014): 54–80. 
74 Alexander Thompson, “The Global Regime for Climate Finance: Political and Legal Challenges,” in The 
Oxford Handbook of Climate Change Law, ed. Kevin R. Gray, Richard Tarasofsky, and Cinnamon 
Carlarne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 148. 
75 Sébastien Jodoin, Forest Preservation in a Changing Climate (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2017), 38–39. 
76 See Sébastien Duyck, Sébastien Jodoin, and Alyssa Johl, “Integrating Human Rights in Global Climate 
Governance: An Introduction,” in Routledge Handbook of Human Rights and Climate Governance, ed. 
Sébastien Duyck, Sébastien Jodoin, and Alyssa Johl (London: Routledge, 2018), 3–15. 
77 Mark A. Pollack and Gregory C. Shaffer, “The Interaction of Formal and Informal International 
Lawmaking,” in Informal International Lawmaking, ed. Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses A. Wessel, and Jan 
Wouters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 262. 
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3. Revelations 
William Twining’s call for an adaptation of Western intellectual traditions to engage with 
new realities of global law has caused powerful ripples. This is not only the case in terms 
of the substance of emerging scholarship on the globalization of law, but through 
Twining’s methodological modelling of the practices of humility, self-reflection and self-
criticism.78 Twining engages in a masterful exercise of revelation, peeling away the 
trappings of legal doctrine and legal methodology to reveal core assumptions embedded in 
the Western legal tradition. His work presents a timely challenge for climate lawyers to 
adopt a global gaze capable of extending across time, disciplines, cultures and legal 
structures to unearth their underlying assumptions.  
 
Given that climate law is an abstract term used to describe diffuse legal phenomena, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that a search for climate law’s epistemology and core underlying 
assumptions often leads to conflict and contestation. Climate law self-presents through 
both fears and aspirations. It is seen hopefully as providing the mechanisms to harness 
markets, correct their failures, and redirect economic activity. And it is seen fearfully as 
capable of reduction to the tasks of carbon market-facilitating institutions (contract, 
property and corporate forms) and responding to market asymmetries and dysfunctions. 
Climate law is seen to emerge at the “clash of civilizations” between climate justice and 
neoliberalism.79 This incongruity makes it perhaps unsurprising that little is written about 
the assumed purpose of climate law.80 
 
Yet by engaging with existential threats81 and inadequate legal responses,82 climate law 
brings new and distinct pressure points to bear on the transnational law concept. It reveals 
how little attention traditional legal theory has paid to the fact that Western legal traditions 
                                                          
78 See e.g. William Twining, Globalisation and Legal Scholarship (Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 
2011). 
79 Rosemary Lyster, “The Idea of (Climate) Justice, Neoliberalism, and the Talanoa Dialogue,” 36. 
80 Stephens extends this query to question why international environmental law exists at all in the 
Anthropocene, when already “many of Earth’s environmental systems have passed a point of no return.” 
Tim Stephens, “What is the Point of International Environmental Law Scholarship in the Anthropocene?” 
in Perspectives on Environmental Law Scholarship, ed. Ole W. Pedersen (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2018), 124. 
81 David Wallace-Wells begins his book with the words: “It is worse, much worse, than you think.” David 
Wallace-Wells, The Uninhabitable Earth: Life After Warming (New York: Tim Duggan Books, 2019) 3. 
82 The inadequacies of interstate legal processes are often the real reason behind so-called ‘innovative’ 
forms of regulation attracting attention as transnational climate governance initiatives. 
The emergence of so-called ‘innovative’ forms of regulation attracting attention as transnational climate 
governance initiatives are frequently traced to the inadequacies of interstate legal processes. See e.g. 
Kenneth W. Abbott, “Strengthening the Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change,” 
Transnational Environmental Law 3, no. 1 (2014): 57–88. 
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are predicated on exploitative views of the planet. Transnational legal theory, while 
increasingly alert to the ‘North-South’ cleavage, as well as the problems endemic in 
crudely framing the world into the Global North and Global South,83 has been less attentive 
to the ‘them and us’ mentality that marks law’s treatment of the natural world.  
 
Dipesh Chakrabarty asks whether “the climate crisis – as symptomatic of humanity’s 
ecological overshoot – also signals the first glimpse we might have of a possible limit to 
our very human-centered thinking about justice, and thus to our political thought as well.”84 
While international law scholarship has taken important steps in tracing the historical 
significance of exploitative visions of the environment for its own development, this legacy 
extends to the contemporary contexts where the transnational legal gaze often focuses.85 
The foundational importance for law of conceiving of nature as a resource comes into view 
through recent histories of neoliberalism, which detail the institutionalisation of a 
worldview contemplating “the earth as a vast territory of varying natural endowments that 
needed to be exploited as thoroughly as possible through the mobility of capital, labor, and 
commerce.”86 This vision has occupied an enduring role in international law’s concept of 
natural environment as something to be exploited for human use.87 TWAIL-inspired 
scholars have linked this historic view of the environment through to the realities of a 
present-day environmental agenda established by and around the priorities and concerns of 
affluent countries.88 It is a view that clashes with an alternative vision brought forward by 
the realities of climate change – one of an intensely interdependent human-nature 
relationship.  
                                                          
83 Julian Eckl and Ralph Weber, “North-South? Pitfalls of Dividing the World by Words,” Third World 
Quarterly 28, no. 1 (2007): 3–23. 
84 Dipesh Chakrabarty, “Whose Anthropocene? A Response,” in “Whose Anthropocene? Revisiting Dipesh 
Chakrabarty’s ‘Four Theses,’” ed. Robert Emmett and Thomas Lekan, RCC Perspectives: Transformations 
in Environment and Society 2016, no. 2: 109. 
85 For example, Karin Mickelson analyses how the legal subject of territory traces to an understanding of 
nature as “existing for the benefit of humans.” Karin Mickelson, “The Maps of International Law: 
Perceptions of Nature in the Classification of Territory,” Leiden Journal of International Law 27 (2014): 
621–639; quoting 637. 
86 Quinn Slobodian, Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2018), 107. 
87 Kishan Khoday et al., “Locating Nature: Making and Unmaking International Law: Introduction,” Leiden 
Journal of International Law 27 (2014): 571–72. Stephen Humphreys and Yoriko Otomo, “Theorising 
International Environmental Law,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law, ed. Anne 
Orford and Florian Hoffmann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 797–819. 
88 See Sumudu Atapattu and Carmen G. Gonzalez, “The North–South Divide in International 
Environmental Law: Framing the Issues,” in International Environmental Law and the Global South, ed. 
Shawkat Alam, Sumudu Atapattu, Carmen G. Gonzalez, and Jona Razzaque (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015), 2. 
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III. Methodological Challenges Facing Transnational Climate Law 
 
1. The Negative Spaces: Unenvironmental Law and Unclean Energy Law 
 
 
Figure 1: The two face, one vase illusion was developed around 1915 by the Danish psychologist 
Edgar Rubin. It illustrates the work of negative space, allowing the viewer a mental choice between two 
interpretations of an image. Ittelson, W. H. (1969). Visual Space Perception, Springer Publishing Company, 
LOCCCN 60-15818 
 
This chapter has already noted the ways in which discussions of ‘climate law’ often default 
to focus on very recent legal initiatives manifesting through legislative change and judicial 
decisions, the constantly evolving international law and institutional architecture, and  the 
climate governance initiatives emerging from networks and assemblages involving non-
state actors that self-advertise their climate change focus. These defaults tend to capture 
explicit forms of rule-making responsive to historically recent climate change. Harder to 
conceptualise, but worthy of attention, are the vast arenas of law-related activity relevant 
to climate change that appear or work in the background free of any climate law packaging 
or self-advertisement.  
The artistic concept of negative space has parallels in law that can assist with such an 
attempt to extend climate law’s content and scope. Negative space is the area between and 
around objects in an image or photograph. An awareness of negative space allows the core 
image to come more sharply into view, and reminds the viewer that perception involves 
choices of interpretation. In law, such an approach means looking outside and around the 
small amount of law conceived as ‘environmental law’ or ‘climate law’ to understand how 
other aspects of law-making consist of unenvironmental law or unclean energy law. This 
allows for a deeper inquiry into how legal systems perpetuate global warming and hamper 
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efforts to address it, such as through mechanisms of indirect or hidden support for fossil 
fuel activities.89 
Examples of unenvironmental or unclean energy law are not always evident. They often 
come to light gradually, as assumptions or defaults underlying common legal practices are 
identified and challenged. Environmental impact assessment law offers a fertile ground for 
studying these practices, as courts have affirmed the importance of analyzing the secondary 
climate impacts of approvals for projects such as coal mines.90 Such decisions help to 
illuminate the ‘negative space’ of climate law, using environmental impact assessment law 
to acknowledge that the impact of a mine lies not only in its own carbon footprint, but 
includes the reality that the coal it produces will eventually be burned. 
Transnational environmental law’s ongoing search for new methods lead to an expansion, 
and indeed a reimagination of what legal spaces are relevant to climate governance.91 Such 
spaces come to light through work identifying the obstacles to effective accountability for 
climate change-induced harms.92 They emerge through scholarship alert to how carbon 
market regulation risks overwhelming other aspects of ‘carbon law,’ constraining law’s 
role to the tasks of creating, supporting and occasionally disciplining ‘markets.’93 They are 
revealed by approaching climate law as a social justice issue94 and by challenging the 
tendency to premise legal responses to climate change “on forms of incremental 
managerialism and proceduralism” and “ticking boxes.”95 It is this work of destabilizing 
received categories and concepts of law that reveals transnational law’s ability to bring into 
view alternative knowledges and the possibility of alternative futures. 
                                                          
89 For an investigation of the economic forms of such subsidies, see Shelagh Whitley et al., G7 Fossil Fuel 
Subsidy Scorecard: Tracking the Phase-Out of Fiscal Support and Public Finance for Oil, Gas and Coal, 
(London: Overseas Development Institute, 2018), https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-
documents/12222.pdf. 
90 See Gloucester Resources Ltd v. Minister for Planning, [2019] NSWLEC 7; Gray v. Minister for 
Planning, [2006] NSWLEC 720, 152 LGERA 258. 
91 See especially Elisa Morgera, Louisa Parks, and Mika Schröder, “Methodological Challenges of 
Transnational Environmental Law,” BENELEX Working Paper No 21 (25 March 2019), DOI: 
10.2139/ssrn.3359597. 
92 Kim Bouwer, “The Unsexy Future of Climate Change Litigation,” Journal of Environmental Law 30, no. 
3 (2018): 489–90. 
93 Climate finance is one example of this market-creation activity where law becomes relegated to the role 
of ‘regulator.’ Megan Bowman, Banking on Climate Change: How Finance Actors and Transnational 
Regulatory Regimes are Responding (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2015). 
94 International Bar Association Task Force on Climate Change Justice and Human Rights, Achieving 
Justice and Human Rights in an Era of Climate Disruption (London: International Bar Association, 2014), 
2. 
95 Philip Alston, Climate Change and Poverty: Report of the Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human 
Rights, UNHRC, 41st Sess, A/HRC/41/39 (25 June 2019) at para 87. 
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To date, the study of transnational legal activity has focused predominantly on space, 
particularly by extending analysis beyond the nation-state, the “default container”96 of legal 
study. Climate law scholarship has the power to challenge other forms of legal myopia, 
bringing into view boundaries and borders other than the territorial. Considering the 
complexity of climate change law and the vast workload to continually update the growing 
datasets mapping national and regional approaches to climate law,97 it is easy to focus on 
legal regulation in a context of presentism and looming future threats.98  Scholarship that 
seeks an understanding of climate crises from study of the very distant past illuminates 
how it may be a trait of only present-day environmental regulation to look to economists 
to define the universalizing models that will shape our future.99  Longer-term historical 
narratives allow scholars to challenge the received wisdom on the history of climate 
change.100 Such narratives teach contemporary climate activists “that their dissident views 
in fact represent a long tradition of contestation.”101 
2. The Place of Practice 
Transnational law offers the tantalizing potential of richly accounting for the lived realities 
of law through its practice. Philip Jessup addressed the need to better capture law’s practice 
in explaining the very need for transnational law. His invocation of the practical was multi-
dimensional. It encompassed an approach of seeing law as a way of addressing the 
problems applicable to the “complex interrelated world community.”102 Appreciating these 
problems, and their potential solutions, required practitioner knowledge and the ability to 
transcend not only legal sub-disciplines but also to appreciate the relevance of extra-legal 
processes and sources of norms.103 Jessup thus sought to align legal concepts with external 
                                                          
96 Jo Guldi and David Armitage, The History Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 
15. 
97 See e.g. Daniel A. Farber and Marjan Peeters, eds., Climate Change Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
2016).  
98 For an exploration of law’s complicity in distancing people from nature's biorhythms see Benjamin J. 
Richardson, Time and Environmental Law: Telling Nature’s Time (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2017). 
99 Guldi and Armitage, The History Manifesto, 12. 
100 Dipesh Chakrabarty, “The Climate of History: Four Theses,” Critical Inquiry 35, no. 2 (2009): 197–222. 
101 Guldi and Armitage, The History Manifesto, 35. 
102 Jessup, Transnational Law, 1. 
103 “One notes that the problem of extracting and refining oil in Iran may involve - as it has - Iranian law, 
English law, and public international law. Procedurally it may involve - as it has - diplomatic negotiations, 
proceedings in the International Court of Justice and in the Security Council, business negotiations with 
and among oil companies, and action in the Iranian Majlis.” Ibid, 6. 
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“realities,”104 suggesting that rules emanate from “practices” as diverse as those of General 
Motors, secret societies, towns, cities, or states.105  
In the sixty years since Jessup’s Storrs lecture, appeals to practice in legal scholarship have 
multiplied. The common vocabulary of practice and practices circulating through this 
scholarship may hide the fact that very different ideas are being invoked in appeals to 
practice. Indeed, as legal scholarship exhibits a growing comfort with sociolegal and 
ethnographic methodologies that seek to understand law through social practices, it 
remains difficult to elucidate whether the ‘practices’ being referred to are social practices, 
legal practices, or something else entirely. Unfortunately, the language of practice seems 
to be invoked somewhat more often than effort is put into articulating what is indicated by 
it.  
Simply put, legal scholarship seems to have sidestepped the detailed methodological 
debates that have marked the “practice turns” in other disciplines such as international 
relations or history.106 The consequence is that legal practice tends to be invoked as some 
non-contentious and non-political body of common knowledge without being subjected to 
the usual questions of legitimacy given to sources of law, and sources of knowledge about 
law. In this fashion, practice acquires an assumed rationality, rather than an up-for-debate 
one.  The value of studying practices to reveal unconscious knowledges, which might be 
taken for granted or obscured, and unseen dynamics of socialization107 remains no less 
relevant to current transnational law scholarship.108 
Climate law provides a poignant entry point into these debates. There is no debating the 
need for pragmatic and strategic legal interventions. Yet legal expertise in evolving fields 
such as climate engineering straddles challenging divides – calling for knowledge of 
technical processes, their long-term governance implications, and drawing on an 
                                                          
104 Ibid, 7.  
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understanding of ecological integrity and principles of social and environmental justice.109 
The particular knowledge, social practices, and contributions of climate lawyers are rarely 
the subject of legal texts,110 but the influence of these lawyers is indisputable.111  
Neil Walker’s Intimations of Global Law (2015) represents a rare effort to see in legal 
practice “a reflection and expression of law’s diverse content and resource set.”112  He 
explains: 
Transnational lawyers are not merely the ‘hired guns’ of big business, though that is a 
significant part of the work of many and the defining function of some. They also 
possess a more versatile remit as a ‘common carrier’ of the wider range of client and 
broader constituency interests in regulation and litigation. The involvement of lawyers 
in transnational processes is not simply an expression of professional economic interest 
and power in globally expanded markets, therefore, but also speaks to their relationship 
to wider questions of public policy and social justice.113  
Walker presents a kaleidoscopic account of the jurisgenerative activities through which 
transnational lawyers, including academic lawyers are “taking law to the world.”114 This 
work challenges the myth of a faceless transnational realm. Instead, it populates that realm 
with the activities of globally inclined academics, judges and other legal experts who are 
“increasingly well placed to imagine new ways of framing, naming, patterning and 
projecting in global terms the unwieldy multiverse of transnational law to which they and 
their fellow legal specialists have done so much to contribute at the levels of practice, 
interpretation, drafting and design.”115 
  
                                                          
109 A. Neil Craik and William C. G. Burns, Climate Engineering Under the Paris Agreement: A Legal and 
Policy Primer (Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2016). 
110 A possible source of inspiration for future work on this topic is Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth’s rich 
account of the role of United States law firms and lawyers in producing and exporting neoliberal 
economics, US-based conceptions of the state, and human rights law. Yves Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth, 
The Internationalization of Palace Wars (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002). 
111 Highly visible contributions include Baker & McKenzie’s creation of various climate law guides, 
including the influential online CDM Rulebook. “Baker & McKenzie launches online environment rule 
book,” Lawyers Weekly, 3 April 2008, https://www.lawyersweekly.com.au/news/616-baker-amp-
mckenzie-launches-online-environment-rul. 
112 Neil Walker, Intimations of Global Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 33. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid, 52. 
115 Ibid, 53. 
21 
 
3. The Faceless Transnational 
The spaces and rhythms of transnationalism favour a visual fix on processes, flows, 
networks, and governance arrangements that may be only partially tethered to people.116 
This tendency towards abstraction manifests in many ways.117 It is evident in dominant 
vocabularies describing actors, ranging from non-state actors,118 to treatment of the Global 
South as a monolith,119 to the equally abstract concept of a climate migrant.120 It is reflected 
in ways of identifying climate law’s subjects as legal persons such as corporations, states, 
municipalities, or as abstract segments of society such as consumers or polluters or car 
drivers, rather than locating ourselves as critical subjects.121 
While interdisciplinary inquiry is a critical aspect of climate law scholarship, such inquiry 
can be threatened by reductionist practices – practices involving reliance on truncated 
insights from ‘science’ or ‘economics,’ rather than acknowledging the complexity 
underlying scientific and economic thought and ways of knowing.  The search for 
measurable outcomes of climate governance processes unsurprisingly privileges thinking 
of the world through measurable targets, goals, and units of greenhouse gas emissions. 
Carbon markets require the ability to attach a dollar amount to a unit of sequestered carbon, 
carbon kept out of the atmosphere for a specific period of time. The depoliticization of 
governance by indicators and other calculative practices is now well-explored in 
scholarship,122 but remains difficult to resist. The simplification and abstraction demanded 
by “measurementality” permeates law’s engagement with climate change as the science–
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policy interface becomes tasked with generating user-friendly scientific knowledge that is 
considered politically and economically relevant.123    
Climate plans, climate strategies, and the creation of forms of greenhouse gas emission 
accounting require particular forms of scientific and economic knowledge created by 
expert groups. Lawyers occupy key roles in creating the blueprints of climate law 
governance, participating in global technical expert groups, chairing committees, and 
drafting and editing committee reports. These mechanisms of generating climate law 
norms, which incorporate public and private institutions, are encapsulated in practices of 
‘law-making’ that, as Martti Koskenniemi argues, represent a shift from the task of 
‘legislating’: 
The most important ‘laws’ in Europe or the world are not those enacted in 
parliaments but those managed by economic or technical experts so as to avoid 
collapse but ultimately so as to produce optimal outcomes. In this optimistic 
understanding, laws are not about what we ‘want’ but what we ‘know’ about the 
world: they declare truths that scientists, economists and technical experts have 
uncovered or will do so in the nearest future.124 
The rhythms of carbon accounting that animate approaches to climate law-making contrast 
sharply with the rhythms of social and environmental interconnectedness and the realities 
of actual people and places, which human rights approaches seek to acknowledge.125 The 
temporal dimensions of climate law governance, combining a fixation with mapping the 
polycentric reality of very recent and emerging governance arrangements and an ever-
looming yet unknown future, further shifts our gaze towards the abstract.  
The carbon atom has become the central organizing logic, the faceless abstract entity that 
has mobilized the transformation of law and governance canvassed in this chapter. And 
yet, transnational law theory continues to focus on disruptions caused by shifting 
conceptions of the state, with only occasional acknowledgement of the consequences for 
law of the disruptions caused by recent human interference with the Earth’s systems, 
geophysical processes and cycles. The intrusion of earthly life into debates about the 
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changing contours of political community represents “a far more radical challenge than the 
postulation of the supposedly ‘post-sovereign’ conditions of late modernity.”126 But the 
types of lively debates the concept of ‘the Anthropocene’ has fostered in the natural and 
social sciences have yet to significantly influence the direction of transnational legal 
scholarship.127 Even as legal thinking turns to draw on Earth systems governance128 and 
new forms of planetary politics that acknowledge the Earth as “a new political actor,”129 
the reliance on abstractions does not go away, but simply shifts focus. The new boundaries 
brought into view are planetary ones, the epistemological binary under threat is the human–
nature divide, and the carbon atom becomes a powerful new form around which life is both 
calculated and politicised.130 
Concluding Thoughts 
The ecological overshoot of humanity requires us to both zoom into the details of 
intra-human injustice—otherwise we do not see the suffering of many humans—
and to zoom out of that history, or else we do not see the suffering of other species 
and, in a manner of speaking, of the planet.131 
Transnational climate law offers a particularly rich opportunity for such zooming in and 
zooming out. While the term transnational climate law may only be an abstract label 
bringing into view disparate processes of lawmaking, the term is broad enough to allow 
investigation of law’s border crossing travels, and its boundary-piercing nature. While 
climate law scholarship still privileges positivist accounts of law by counting new 
examples of federal legislation and providing extended commentary on climate lawsuits, 
the reality of climate law-making in other venues including carbon markets, consumer 
approaches, expert committees, carbon disclosures, and human rights indicators, is far from 
hidden. Transnational law scholarship has problematized the shifts propelled by these 
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realities, the related assumption of core governance functions by non-state actors, and the 
asymmetries of knowledge and power that underlie many carbon projects and transactions. 
While climate governance tends to focus on the present and near-future, scholars are 
beginning to explore law’s complicity in entrenching the “carbon footprint” that “haunts 
every step of the history of industrial and colonial expansion of the last centuries.”132  
Bruno Latour’s Down to Earth: Politics in the New Climatic Regime (2012) draws attention 
to the last century’s social movements’ massive and profound failure to connect the dots 
between social and environmental conflicts.133 This work challenges scholars to explain 
not only the complicated current terrain of transnational lawmaking, but the legal 
transformations that have not taken place. The non-occurrence of transformative climate 
law may indeed be one of the consequences of leaving unchallenged a particular and 
dominant vision of law, one whose solitudes continue to separate the environment from the 
social.  
Writing about climate law is, and may well remain, a rather miserable endeavor. It may be 
useful to explore why this is the case. A subject as broad and disparate as climate 
lawmaking means writing in a context where the problems of massive incompleteness of 
knowledge, outdatedness, narrowness, and pointlessness are one’s constant companions.  
Accusations of alarmism co-exist with the ever-present threat that one is recklessly under- 
playing what is at stake. Transnational climate law takes some steps towards addressing 
these challenges. It brings into view shifting territorial as well as conceptual spaces of law-
making. Yet it leaves the boundary separating Humans from Nature largely intact, and the 
planetary boundaries that define law’s operating space still largely unacknowledged.   
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